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Abstract 
The Life-Cycle Hypothesis posits that saving should be positive for households in their 
working span and negative for the retired ones, and wealth therefore should be hump-
shaped. Yet, if one looks at the microeconomic evidence on saving by age, dissaving by the 
elderly is limited or absent. The measures of saving generally used in previous tests are 
based on a concept of income that does not properly take into account the role of mandated 
public pension arrangements, to wit, disposable income. This measure treats pension 
contributions as taxes, and pension benefits as transfers. In reality, contributions represent 
an accumulation, or saving, designed to provide for post-retirement income in the form of a 
pension. That contribution should therefore be recognized as (mandatory) allocation of 
income to life cycle saving. Accordingly, pension contributions should be added back to 
disposable income and to discretionary life cycle saving. Similarly, pension benefits 
accruing to the retired do not represent income produced, but a drawing from the pension 
wealth accumulated up to retirement. We use Italian repeated cross-sectional data from 
1989 to 2000 to show that when this adjustment is performed, saving and wealth over the 
life cycle exhibit the characteristic hump shape implied by LCH, and that the adjustment 
also contributes to an understanding of the saving behavior of the elderly. 
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The Life-Cycle Hypothesis posits that the main motivation for saving is to accumulate 
resources for later expenditure and in particular to support consumption at the habitual 
standard during retirement. According to the model, saving should be positive for households 
in their working span and negative for the retired ones, and wealth therefore should be hump-
shaped (Modigliani, 1986). Yet, if one looks at the microeconomic evidence on household 
saving rates by age, dissaving by the elderly is seldom observed. 
To take just one example, in the introductory essay of a collection of country studies on 
saving, Poterba (1994) reports that in virtually all nations the median saving rate is positive 
well beyond retirement, concluding that “the country studies provide very little evidence that 
supports the Life-Cycle model.” Based on the country studies, Poterba also reports that the 
median saving rate in the age class 70-74 is 1.1 percent in the United States and 6 percent in 
Canada; and in Italy and Japan for those aged 65 and older it is even higher. 
These figures are inconsistent not only with the elementary version of the LCH, but also 
with more elaborate versions. In its basic formulation, the LCH posits that saving behavior is 
forward looking and driven by the desire to prepare for future expenditures above later 
income throughout life. The main foreseeable event in one’s life is old age and retirement. At 
this time earned income may be expected, on average to dwindle to a level well below active 
life consumption. This implies that an essential observable implication of the LCH is the 
existence of phases of life − notably during the retirement period − when consumption tends 
to exceed earned income financed by negative saving in the form of a reduction in wealth 
accumulated in the earning span. Refinement of the standard model, allowing for uncertainty, 
precautionary saving and accidental bequests may affect the age after which one should start 
observing wealth decumulation. It does not, however, affect the main implication of the 
theory that individual wealth should eventually tend to fall with age, with saving becoming 
prevailingly negative. Thus, the widely reported positive saving rates at old ages are 
interpreted as a strong contradiction of the LCH, and as consistent only with alternative 
behavioral models of saving. The following are some examples: models in which irrational 
consumers make no preparation for retirement and cannot draw on previously accumulated 
assets or do not need to draw thanks to a government handout; or models in which saving is 





In this paper we demonstrate why these tests throw no light whatsoever on the empirical 
relevance of the LCH, and are at best a test of a mockery of that hypothesis. A simple 
explanation for this error, is that individuals have forgotten that there are multiple ways of 
defining income and consumption, and hence numerous ways of measuring saving, which is 
essentially the difference between the two. 
To illustrate, one may define income as total output, nominal or real, personal, private 
or national, gross or net of depreciation, gross or net of various kinds of government levies, 
and so on which produce a dozen measures of a country’s saving. Surprisingly enough, the 
above authors have failed to ask themselves which of these many concepts are relevant for a 
test of the LCH. They have thus failed to realize that there is only one concept that is 
appropriate: anyone who understands the spirit of the LCH – consumption smoothing in the 
face of the life cycle of earned income – will agree that the appropriate concept of income is 
earned family income (net of personal taxes) less family consumption. 
This is the measure of income (and saving) that will be used in our tests. In other words 
for testing the LCH, saving must be defined and measured to include any portion of current 
earned income that is not consumed, but is used to provide purchasing power for later 
expenditures, such as retired consumption. Therefore that part of the pay that is allocated to a 
pension plan − private or public, voluntary or mandated − and contributes to support later 
consumption must be included in saving in any test of the LCH. On the other hand pensions 
are not currently earned income but the counterpart for past income; they are paid out of 
accumulated past contributions and must be excluded from income in computing saving. 
By contrast the authors we have criticized have routinely relied on the customary measure of 
saving used in the National Income Accounts, namely Disposable Income minus 
consumption, labeled Personal Saving. This definition differs from ours in that it endeavors to 
measure “cash income,” and not income earned. It excludes from income and saving all 
contributions to Public Pension institutions. Although part of the workers pay, they are 
generally not received in the form of cash. Pensions, rather, are paid in cash and hence are 
included in disposable income and saving, although they are not part of the current pay, or 
income produced. 
It is obvious that the concept of cash income is not only irrelevant, but also highly 
misleading. What comes to be subtracted and added from earned income to arrive at 





NIA path, which cuts off from the age profiles of earned income, saving and wealth; the very 
humps the life cycle paradigm is all about. 
 In most developed countries, disposable and earned income can thus be expected to 
exhibit a quite different life path. Using Italy as an example, we will demonstrate these 
propositions. Italy is admittedly an extreme case with pension contributions in excess of 30 
percent and inordinately high replacement rates. But the subtractions and additions are very 
large in developed countries, in particular in Western Europe. It is not surprising, then, that 
the other authors find little life cycle left in their NIA measure and that, using the correct 
measure of family earnings, saving and wealth, the bumps return with a vengeance. 
 
2. Definitions, measurement and relation to earlier work 
 
We implement appropriate definitions and measures of income and saving to Italian 
repeated cross-sectional data. In particular, income will be measured as earned income (labor 
plus property income) net of personal taxes. By subtracting consumption we get the relevant 
measure of total family accumulation, which we call total (household) saving. This quantity 
in turn can be broken down into two components: 
 
•  Contributions to pension plans less pensions received, which for practical purposes in 
Italy consist only in contributions to and from Social Security and are therefore 
referred to as mandatory saving. 
 
•  The difference between total and mandated saving, which we label personal or 
discretionary saving. This component coincides with the NIA “Personal Saving” and 
with the concept erroneously used in earlier tests. 
 
Central to our analysis is the proposition that (net) contributions to pension plans are to 
be regarded as a component of total saving, because, like any other type of life cycle saving, 
they constitute a portion of current income that is not consumed, but used to build up reserves 
for later consumption. One might challenge this point of view on the ground that true saving 
should result in an increment in national wealth or capital. Yet, in many public pension 





between contributions and national saving. To answer this objection one must understand the 
relation − and interaction − between various saving flows, private and public. 
Consider first the relation between mandated saving, discretionary saving, and their 
sum, total saving. This interaction has been the subject of pioneering contributions of 
Munnell (1974) and Feldstein (1976) through the “extended life-cycle model.” They pointed 
out that pension wealth should be counted as part of individuals’ resources, and argued 
forcefully that the transition to a social security regime would affect discretionary saving. In 
fact, if the LCH is correct in asserting that total saving is controlled by a target accumulation 
to support retirement, one might conclude that social security and discretionary wealth (or 
saving) should largely offset each other. This offset is what the above authors call the 
substitution effect − pension saving crowding out discretionary saving. But they go on to 
point out that this effect might be well below one-for-one because of the induced retirement 
effect: the provision of social security pension facilitates earlier, longer retirement, which in 
turn tends to raise target wealth and saving. 
Since these contributions, many authors have estimated pension wealth with 
microeconomic data and provided age-breakdowns; to name just a few, Blinder, Gordon and 
Wise (1983) and Gale (1998) for the US, King and Dycks-Mireaux (1982) for Canada, 
Alessie, Kapteyn, and Klijn (1997) for the Netherlands, and Jappelli (1995), Attanasio and 
Brugiavini (2003) and Jappelli, Padula and Bottazzi (2003) for Italy. Several studies also tried 
to estimate the impact of mandated wealth on discretionary wealth, and the prevailing 
conclusion is that the former does tend to reduce the latter, but the effect is well below one-
for-one; in fact the reduction is generally less than 1/2. This result, however, may reflect not 
only the retirement induced effect, but also other effects, such as ignorance or concern that in 
the end the social security system may be unable to deliver on its promises. Whatever the 
reason, the implication is that social security contributions may well result in significant 
increase in total household wealth, and of retirement wealth in particular. 
As for the relation between personal saving and national saving, the key point is that 
national saving is the sum of private and government saving and so the relation depends on 
what happens to government saving. That, in turn, largely depends on the way pensions are 
financed. If they are financed by the traditional funded system, then the total saving is 
invested directly or indirectly in productive capital; thus the mandated contribution might 





                                                
readily verify that under an ideal pay-as-you go system the social security contributions will 
have no effect on national saving. This is because while they increase private saving and 
wealth, they are offset by an equal government deficit. The situation is similar to what 
happens when the private sector uses some of its saving to buy newly issued government 
debt, and the proceeds are then used to cover a current account deficit. 
The exercise we perform in this paper is related to the intergenerational accounting 
framework proposed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991) who aim to measure how 
much existing generations can be expected to pay to the government over their remaining 
lifetimes. Generational accounts provide measures of cohort-specific receipts and payments 
that can be used to evaluate the intergenerational redistributive impact of fiscal policy. Our 
focus here is primarily the computation of cohort-adjusted mandatory saving age profiles 
implied by the current pension arrangements. Other kinds of transfers, such as medical 
payments, are of course important, but are neglected in the present analysis. 
Some researchers have already recognized that total saving should be estimated as the 
accumulation of total wealth, including pension wealth.1 The earliest attempt is Bosworth, 
Burtless and Sabelhaus (1991), who compute various saving definitions to data from the US 
Consumer Survey. In one of their calculations, they show that with the pension adjustment the 
saving rates of households aged 64 plus falls from 11 to −4 percent (their adjustment refers to 
private pension funds but excludes social security wealth). 
More recently, Gokhale, Kotlikoff and Sabelhaus (1996) report US propensities to save 
out of two definitions of income. Conventional disposable income is the sum of labor income, 
capital income, and pension income less taxes. Alternative disposable income classifies social 
security contributions as loans to the government, and social security benefits as the 
repayment of principal plus interest on past social security loans, less an old age tax. They 
find that the propensity to save is negative in old age, and much lower when using the 
alternative definition (Figure 10, p. 346). They also stress that any test of the LCH should not 
rely on income flows, which are based on questionable definitions, but rather focus on the 
propensity to consume out of total resources (the sum of discretionary, pension and human 
 
1 When measuring the aggregate saving rate, defining saving as earned income minus consumption or 
as disposable income minus consumption does not make a great difference. Gale and Sabelhaus (1999, 
Table 2) adjust NIPA figures for the United States and point out that adding net saving in federal, state 
and government retirement plans raises the aggregate saving rate by less then 1.5 percentage points 
over the entire 1960-98 period. The reason is that government pension saving is fairly stable and that 





                                                
wealth). It is an implication of the LCH that the propensity to consume out of total resources 
should be increasing with age, an implication that is supported by their Figure 9 (p. 345).2
In Section 3 we present the dataset, which is drawn from the 1989-2000 Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a total of six cross-sections, each of which is 
representative of the Italian population. These data contain information not only on flows of 
income, consumption, pension contributions, and pension benefits, but also on the stock of 
wealth held by the respondents. This enables us to construct age profile of measures of assets 
corresponding to the three saving flows. The survey provides direct information on the wealth 
accumulated through personal or discretionary saving, which we label discretionary wealth. 
We construct a measure of accumulation through social security (mandated or pension 
wealth) from statutory information about contributions, imputed rate of return (growth), 
replacement rates, retirement age, and life expectancy. Finally, by summing the two 
measures, we obtain our estimates of the life profile of total wealth. 
The estimate of the life cycle of wealth and its component is of interest in terms of 
testing whether they are hump shaped. In addition they can be used for an interesting test of 
the internal consistency of saving and wealth data, based on the consideration that saving 
should result in a corresponding change in wealth. We can thus compare the life cycle path of 
each component of saving with the change in the corresponding stock. 
In the next two sections we report the two independent estimates of the age-profile of 
saving implied by our cohort data. In Section 4, we first estimate the age-profile of 
discretionary wealth, pension wealth and total wealth. From these estimates we derive for 
each component an estimate of the age profile of saving by taking the increment in wealth 
from one age to the next. In Section 5, for each component we report the age-profile of saving 
measured, in the standard fashion, as the difference between the relevant measures of income 
and consumption flows. We find that for two concepts of saving – total and pension saving –
the change in wealth and the flow measure are reasonably similar and consistent with the 
LCH. However, in the case of discretionary accumulation, the two measures show surprising 
discrepancies. 
 
2 It should be noted that their study is based on an unusual and questionable attribution of resources to 
individuals, not households, which is an approach that rests on a number of assumptions. First of all, 
that households are a veil for the individuals who live in them. Second, that there are no public goods 





In Section 6, we discuss various reasons why saving estimated from flow data may 
differ from the change in wealth. By relying on previous studies and other cross-sectional 
data, we gain significant insight into the puzzle, although we fall short of a full understanding. 
In Section 7, we discuss the implications of the estimated age-saving profiles for the 
importance of bequest motives and for the evaluation of the research on the saving behavior 
of the elderly. Section 8 concludes. 
 
3. The repeated cross-sectional data 
 
It is well known that age profiles of individual variables like income, consumption, or 
wealth cannot be estimated using cross-sectional data in a developing economy. This is 
because in such data the age effect is confounded with “cohort” effects – older people come 
from an earlier cohort - and different cohorts frequently have different experiences and 
resources; e.g., with steady technological progress, older cohorts are life cycle poorer than 
younger ones. 
It is only with panel data that one can track individual saving and wealth trajectories 
over time. But in Italy and many other countries this tracking is not feasible for lack of long 
panel data with data on assets, income and consumption. If they are available, repeated cross-
sectional data can partly overcome their absence. Although the same individual is only 
observed once, a sample from the same cohort is observed in a later survey, so that one can 
track the income or consumption not of the same individual, but of a representative sample of 
individuals of the same cohort. 
We use a time-series of cross-sections of Italian households spanning the 1989-2000 
period to control for cohort effects, and to estimate age-profiles of consumption, income, 
saving and wealth. The noteworthy characteristic of our dataset is that it contains separate 
information on income and consumption flows and on wealth, from which alternative 
measures of saving can be constructed and compared. 
The survey we use is the Bank of Italy SHIW (Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth). The purpose of this survey is to provide detailed data on demographics, 
consumption, income, and households’ balance sheets. The data set used in this study 





                                                
total of almost 50,000 observations. The Appendix describes the main features of the survey. 
Brandolini and Cannari (1994) and D’Alessio and Faiella (2002) report further details. 
To gauge the quality of the data, it is useful to compare the SHIW measures of saving 
and wealth with the national accounts. Table 1 indicates that the SHIW measure of saving is 
substantially higher than the national account measure in all years. This is because income in 
the SHIW is more accurately reported than consumption. Furthermore, the national accounts 
saving rate declines substantially over time, while the saving rate estimated with 
microeconomic data is rather constant between 1989 and 2000.3 Finally, the SHIW wealth-
income ratio is generally higher than the national accounts estimate, although in this case the 
difference between the two is less systematic. 
Brandolini and Cannari (1994) report that disposable income is under-reported by 25 
percent with respect to the national accounts data, while consumption is under-reported by 30 
percent. An identifiable measurement error can therefore partly reconcile the level of the 
aggregate saving rate with the one obtained from the microeconomic data. This should be 
kept in mind when evaluating the saving profiles in the next sections, especially when we 
compare the saving profiles obtained as the difference between income and consumption with 
those obtained by first differencing wealth. 
Households headed by persons older than 80 or younger than 25 (regardless of year of 
birth) are excluded from our analysis. These exclusions are motivated by concern over two 
sources of potential sample bias. The first arises from the mortality problem. As a rule, 
surveys only elicit information from individuals who are alive at the time of the survey. 
Surveys therefore miss information on the fraction of the cohort that was alive at the time of 
one survey, but died before a later wave. The seriousness of this problem is demonstrated by 
the fact that we have no ground for believing that the survivors are an unbiased sample of 
those who were alive at the last interview. It is well known that survival probabilities tend to 
be positively correlated with wealth, which implies that the non-survivors will tend to have 
lower income and wealth than the survivor sample. The proportion of non -survivors rises 
 
3 The decline in the aggregate saving rate is not peculiar to the 1989-2000 period, but follows a trend 
starting just after the period of high and sustained growth of the fifties and sixties. In previous work 
(Modigliani and Jappelli, 1990) we emphasize that the reduction in productivity growth is the main 
factor explaining the trend decline in the Italian saving rate, particularly after the 1973 oil shock. Rossi 
and Visco (1995) argue that the accumulation of social security wealth due to the transition to a pay-
as-you-go social security system and the increasing generosity of the system also explain a substantial 
portion of the fall in household saving. Other explanations focus on the reduced need for 





                                                
with age: e.g., for Italy, between age 60 and 64, it reaches 5 percent for women and 11 
percent for men. However, once we reach the age class 80-84 it rises to some 30-40 percent. 
Clearly the information obtainable from survivors over 80 cannot be regarded as 
representative. 
The second source of potential bias is a correlation between wealth and young 
household heads peculiar to our sample. In Italy, young working adults with independent 
living arrangements tend to be wealthier than average, because most young working adults 
live with their parents.4 For instance, the fraction of income recipients below 30 years of age 
is about 20 percent, while the fraction of household heads in that age bracket is less than 10 
percent. Excluding observations whose data was missing for consumption, income or wealth, 
our final sample consists of 46,945 households.  
We use the repeated cross-sections to sort the data by the year of birth of the head of the 
household. The first cohort includes all households whose head was born in 1910,. The 
second includes those born in 1911, and so on up to the last cohort, which includes those born 
in 1974. We then create 334 age/year/cohort cells. The average cell size is 136; the minimum 
is 21, and the maximum 218. As with other survey data, the saving and wealth distributions 
are skewed, and means may not adequately characterize the age-wealth or the age-saving 
profiles. We therefore rely on the median as measure of location and on median regressions 
for econometric analysis. 
 
4. Estimates of saving age profiles with wealth data 
 
Figure 1 offers fundamental insights into the process of wealth accumulation, plotting 
the median discretionary wealth of 11 cohorts. Discretionary wealth is the sum of financial 
and non-financial assets, net of liabilities. To make the graph more readable, we plot only the 
wealth of selected cohorts. The numbers in the graph refer to the year of birth, extending from 
20 (individuals born in 1920) to 70 (individuals born in 1970). Except for the youngest and 
the oldest generations, each cohort is observed at six different points in times, one for each 
cross-section. The cross-sections run from 1989 to 2000. Thus, each generation is observed 
 
4 Reasons for such behavior include mortgage market imperfections, which prevent young households 





                                                
for 11 years with each line being broken (for instance, cohort 20 is sampled 6 times from age 
69 to age 80).  
Following retirement, median wealth falls for most cohorts. This fact is more evident in 
Figure 2, where we plot the wealth profile for cohorts sampled in old age (again, to make the 
graphs more readable, we consider only cohorts born in even years). Although some cohorts 
exhibit an increase in discretionary wealth between age 60 and 65, wealth declines 
considerably at the oldest ages. 
Figures 1 and 2 also clearly show the presence of cohort effects (the broken lines for 
younger cohorts tend to lay above those of the older ones). Time effects also affect the data. 
For instance, the wealth of several cohorts increases in 2000, reflecting either measurement 
errors or common business cycle shocks.5
In the absence of uncertainty the LCH implies that the shape of the wealth profile 
depends on age, regardless of resources, while lifetime resources, regardless of age, set the 
position of the profile. Introducing a positive real interest rate or more realistic earnings 
profiles does not change this basic implication of the model.6 Therefore, one way to combine 
the information contained in Figure 1 in a framework that is consistent with the LCH is to 
assume that the shape of the age-wealth profile is the same for each cohort, and that its level 
depends on cohort-specific intercepts, which primarily reflect differences in productivity 
across generations. 
With uncertainty, macroeconomic shocks lead to revisions in households resources, and 
therefore in assets accumulation. Measurement errors can also generate disturbances to the 
wealth equation. However, it is well known that the separate effects of age, cohort, and time 
cannot be identified. 
One possibility is to rule out uncertainty and measurement errors and eliminate all year 
dummies. Deaton and Paxson (1994) adopt a slightly less restrictive approach and assume 
that the year dummies sum to zero and are orthogonal to the time trend. This is equivalent to 
assuming that all trends in the data can be interpreted as a combination of age and cohort 
effects and are therefore, by definition, predictable. The time effects then reflect additive 
 
5 Two macroeconomic episodes characterize our sample period. The economy went into a recession in 
1991-93. Afterwards the economy began a mild recovery, with the growth rate picking up in 2000. 
6 One should keep in mind that wealth accumulation also depends on households' preferences, the 
interest rate, the life-cycle variation in household size and composition, and the rules governing 
retirement. Additional control variables (such as education, gender or region of residence) do not 





                                                
macroeconomic shocks or the residual influence of non-systematic measurement error. It is 
important to keep in mind that this normalization of time effects rules out time-age or time-
cohort interaction terms. 
The wealth equation is estimated on 334 age/year/cohort cells. Given the structure of 
our sample, the regressors include 55 age dummies, 64 cohort dummies, a set of restricted 
time dummies, and a constant term. Under the assumptions described above, the estimated 
dummies can be interpreted as an individual age-wealth profile, purged from cohort effects, 
while the cohort dummies can be interpreted as the cohort (or generation) effect. All other 
estimates and profiles reported in the paper are constructed in similar fashion. 
For illustrative purposes Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficients on each of the 55 age 
dummies and a smoothed profile obtained by fitting a third-order polynomial to the original 
coefficient estimates. In Figure 3 discretionary wealth rises until age 60, the peak retirement 
age in Italy. It then declines slowly, but remains substantial even in old age. 
Figure 4 plots the estimated cohort effect in wealth - that is, the coefficients of the 64 
cohort dummies. Even though the estimated coefficients exhibit some noise, the smoothed 
profile is remarkably stable, increasing by about 1 thousand euro per year of birth. The most 
natural explanation for the shape of the cohort effect is that it reflects the increase in 
productivity (and therefore resources) of each successive generation. 
In Figure 5, we plot pension wealth and total wealth, the sum of discretionary and 
pension wealth. Pension wealth is the difference between the discounted values of social 
security benefits and contributions.7 Constructing pension wealth thus requires assumptions 
about expected benefits and expected contributions, since they depend on projected income, 
demographic trends, and future legislation. The concave shape of pension wealth is not 
surprising, since the pension system collection and payment are designed to be an imitation of 
the LCH saving and dissaving. 
Total wealth is also hump shaped, rising to a peak of around 250 thousand euro at age 
60, and then declining during retirement. By taking first differences of the estimated wealth 
and of its components at successive ages we can obtain a picture of the age profile of the 
 
7 Since the fraction of Italian households that contributes to private pension funds is tiny, they can be 
safely neglected. The 1995 pension reform of the social security system implements gradual changes 
in eligibility rules, accrual rates and pension age. Our estimate of social security wealth abstracts from 
these institutional details. It provides a rough estimate of expected contributions and benefits whose 





                                                                                                                                                        
accumulation of net worth through life, which is shown in Figure 6. In this figure, 
discretionary saving is computed as the change in discretionary wealth, and is similar for 
mandatory saving and pension wealth. Total saving corresponds to the change in total wealth. 
All three measures of saving derived from wealth are seen to conform to the implications of 
the LCH. They are positive during the work-span, and negative after the retirement age of 
60.8
 
5. Estimates of saving with flow data. 
 
In this section we present an alternative estimate of the age profile of saving based on 
income and consumption flows. We construct two measures of income. One is earned income, 
which we claim is the appropriate measure, and the other is the conventional disposable 
income that was used inappropriately in earlier tests. Consumption is the sum of expenditure 
on durable and non-durable goods and includes imputed rents on owner occupied housing. 
Conventional disposable income is obtained directly from the respondent, but then 
adjusted for imputed rents. Earned income is obtained by adding the mandated contribution to 
social security, which is taken as an approximation to mandated saving through public 
pensions, and subtracting pensions, to disposable income. It should be recognized that social 
security contributions should be counted as part of income and saving to the extent to which 
contributions actually increase the stock of wealth. We approximate mandatory saving with 
the total amount of contributions actually paid by each worker less the total amount received 
as pension benefits. Since contributions are levied at a flat rate on gross earnings, we can 
estimate earned income by blowing up reported disposable income.9
 
assumed replacement rate and contribution rates are, respectively, 70 and 25 percent. See the 
Appendix for details. 
8 Sabelhaus and Pence (1999) use a time series of cross-section wealth surveys to measure how wealth 
accumulation varies across age in the US. They apply a technique similar to ours to the 1989, 1992 
and 1995 Survey of Consumer Finance and are therefore able to purge the age-wealth profile from 
cohort effects. They also compute the change in wealth as a percent of disposable income and find 
positive saving rates in the order of 20 percent until age 60, and negative saving afterwards, ranging 
from −20 percent at age 65 to −50 percent at age 75. 
9 For employees the contribution rate increases from 26 percent of gross earnings in 1989-93 to 27 
percent in 1995-2000. The contributions are split between the employee and the employer. But clearly 
this is immaterial: in both cases it is the employee who actually bears the burden of paying the 
contributions (and finally receives the benefit). For the self-employed the contribution rates are set at 





As it is estimated, the mandatory saving need not coincide with the change in pension 
wealth reported in Figure 6. There we take into account survival probabilities, and make 
explicit assumptions about the growth rate of the economy and the real interest rate. Here we 
simply impute the yearly contributions from net earnings and the benefits from the 
respondent. In practice we find that the two measures of mandatory saving are broadly 
consistent. 
In Figure 7, we plot the age profile of consumption and of the two income measures. 
Each profile is obtained using the microeconomic data in the same fashion used for wealth. 
Median consumption and income in each age/year/cohort cell are regressed on a full set of 
age dummies, cohort dummies and restricted time dummies. The smoothed coefficients of the 
age dummies are then plotted in Figure 7. 
As hypothesized by LCH, consumption is remarkably flat. The moderate hump appears 
to reflect a similar hump in the age profile of family size reported in Figure 8, which mirrors 
the entrance and exit of children (and one spouse) from the households. Since it is not 
essential to our basic argument, we forego any adjustment for family size.  
In Figure 7, the profile of earned income, in contrast to that of consumption, is very 
hump-shaped. It peaks around age 50, which in some respects is surprisingly early. This peak 
may reflect the very young age at which some pensions have been awarded in Italy (so called 
baby pensions). It declines rapidly after age 55, a reflection of the increasing number of 
retired individuals belonging to older age groups. Retirement earned income consists mainly 
of capital income (the return to discretionary wealth), much of which is accounted for by 
imputed rents on owner occupied housing. 
Figure 9 reports the life cycle of saving and its component, implied by Figure 7. The 
path of total or family savings is sharply humped, reflecting the hump path of earned income 
and the flat path of consumption. It becomes increasingly negative after the mid-fifties, which 
is a pattern largely consistent with the LCH. It is also largely consistent with the pattern 
implied by the change in total wealth in Figure 6. 
A comparison of the graph of earned and disposable income reported in Figure 7 brings 
to light how conspicuous subtractions from, and additions to, earned income for Social 
Security contributions and pensions have the effect of largely smoothing and eliminating the 
humps in earned income (which is of course what they were designed for). As a result, the 
humped life cycle of earned income is turned into a remarkably flat path of disposable 





consumption stay very close, so that the path of discretionary saving in Figure 9 is itself quite 
flat. What is surprising is that disposable income is consistently above consumption, which 
means that discretionary saving remains positive throughout the life cycle, or at least until the 
age of 80. 
 
6. Tracking the sources of discrepancy between saving and wealth measures 
 
The finding of a flat profile for discretionary saving is a somewhat surprising result. 
This is for two reasons. First, it is glaringly inconsistent with the reported behavior of 
discretionary wealth. The flat profile implies that discretionary saving never declines, even 
after retirement, whereas according to the wealth data in Figures 5 and 6 discretionary saving 
declines steadily from around age 60. The inconsistency is illustrated in Figure 10. Here, the 
graph compares the two alternative estimates of the life cycle of discretionary saving. Not 
only do they have opposite signs at advanced ages (after 60), but also at the youngest ages 
(below 30). Indeed the two paths look like mirror images of each other! In addition, the 
absence of negative saving has implications for the role of bequests, which we discuss below. 
To search for the explanations for the discrepancy between saving and wealth measures, 
we begin by examining the possible role of factors primarily connected with the Italian data 
or institutions. We then turn to evidence for other countries, and for conceptual differences 
between saving and changes in wealth. 
 
6.1. Sources idiosyncratic to Italy 
 
The role of smoothing 
We began by considering the possibility that the finding of positive saving, even at an 
advanced age, might be the result of distortions induced by smoothing the life cycles of 
consumption and income by polynomials in age. On the basis of Figure 11, which shows a 
plot of the original (not smoothed) data of discretionary saving by age and cohort, we 
promptly dismiss this hypothesis. Clearly saving is humped, but even by age 80, though it is 
smaller than at any other age, it is unmistakably positive. This is once again confirmed by the 





                                                
reported for brevity − indicates that income, wealth, homeownership, education, self-
employment and family size are positively correlated with saving at advanced age. But the 
most noteworthy feature of saving is that less than 20 percent of the aged households report 
negative saving, and that this proportion does not increase with age, even conditioning for 
employment status, education, homeownership, or other household characteristics. 
 
Measurement error 
Next, we have examined a possible role of measurement error, whose presence was 
already suggested by the comparison of microeconomic data with national accounts data 
carried on in Table 1. Cannari and D’Alessio (1994) and D’Alessio and Faiella (2002) report 
that in comparison with national account data, the SHIW consumption is underestimated by 
30 percent, while income is underestimated by 25 percent. For the purposes of this paper we 
are not so much concerned with bias in the level of income and consumption as we are with 
whether the age profile of saving is systematically biased.10 For this reason we cannot rely on 
a comparison with macroeconomic data, and must turn to the only other Italian survey that 
contains data on family income and consumption, namely a 1991 ISTAT Survey of 
Household Budgets. This survey represents a large cross-section and contains detailed 
information on consumption, but has limited income data. We find that the two surveys are 
generally mutually consistent. Both indicate that saving is rather flat and that there is no 
negative saving in old age. 
 
The role of severance pay 
A third possibility we considered is that the difference between the two measures of 
saving could be related to one very unique feature of the Italian system: namely, a mandated 
large severance pay. Each year the employer withholds one months’ wage, to be returned to 
the worker at the time of termination of employment.11 Such severance pay is not included in 
our definition of income (either disposable or earned). Because survey information on 
severance pay is scant, we impute contributions paid in the severance fund pay, grossing up 
 
10 One could thus compute discretionary saving by "blowing up" disposable income by 25 percent, and 
consumption by 30 percent. This adjustment reduces discretionary saving at all ages, but does not 
change the shape of the age-consumption profile, and therefore that of the age-saving profile. In 





                                                                                                                                                        
labor income in proportion to the contribution rate. The result is that mandatory saving and 
pension wealth are correspondingly higher before retirement. After the severance pay fund is 
liquidated, generally at retirement, it should appear as an increment in discretionary wealth 
without changing discretionary saving. This should generate an increase in discretionary 
wealth around retirement that is greater than discretionary saving; the opposite of what we see 
in the data. 
 
6.2. Evidence from other countries and explanations 
 
The international evidence 
We looked to evidence from other countries to see whether it might confirm or reject 
the findings for Italy. In particular, we were concerned with the apparent inconsistencies 
between flows and stocks. With respect to discretionary saving, we found that age profiles flat 
and uniformly positive were reported by several studies for those countries where the amount 
of mandatory saving is substantial. To take just a few recent examples, Poterba (1994) 
summarizes evidence to this effect for the group of most industrialized countries, Alessie et 
al. (1997; 1999) for the Netherlands, and Paxson (1996) for the US and the UK.12
At the same time, the decline in wealth at advanced ages is also confirmed by earlier 
studies. For instance, Diamond and Hausman (1984) find rates of dissaving after retirement of 
about 5 percent per year in the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men. Using the 
Retirement History Survey, Hurd (1987) finds decumulation rates of about 1.5 percent per 
year (3 percent excluding housing in the definition of wealth). Furthermore, the inconsistency 
has been reported in other studies for which both saving and wealth data were available. 
Widespread evidence pointing to the apparent inconsistency between stock and flow 
measures suggests the need to reexamine possible conceptual discrepancies between saving 
and the change in the value of assets in a given period, as measured in the survey. The search 
resulted in identifying multiple sources of discrepancies, which fall into two quite distinct 
types. The first type arises from conceptual differences between saving in a period and the 
 
11 Initially, in Italy severance pay was intended to insure the employee against the risk of dismissal, 
but it gradually evolved into a form of deferred compensation, irrespective of the cause of termination 
of employment. The employee is entitled to it whether he or she retires, is laid off, or quits. 
12 This latter study also presents flat age-saving profiles in Taiwan and Thailand, in which the amount 
of mandatory saving is much more limited. The evidence in these countries is therefore much less 





change in the value of assets during the period, as measured in standard surveys. The second 
type results from the fact that as a cohort ages, the individual composing it keeps changing, 
with young people joining (becoming household heads) at different ages and others exiting 
(because of disability or death). 
 
Conceptual differences between saving and changes in wealth 
The main conceptual discrepancies arise from the fact that wealth cannot only change 
through saving, but also through other channels. Two are of major interest: capital gain/losses 
and inter vivos transfers. 
To what extent could capital gains explain the observed discrepancies? Because of 
formidable obstacles to the estimation of a time series of gains, we cannot offer a precise 
answer. The best we can do is to estimate the capital gains and losses on nominal net assets 
resulting from the widespread incidence of inflation, especially in the early years. Since in 
this period the inflation resulted in net capital losses, the adjustment made the change in 
assets somewhat less negative, but not enough to turn it positive. As for the effect of other 
capital gains, even in the absence of detailed information we can be fairly certain that there 
were substantial real gains coming from residential real estate during the period covered. 
Hence, while one might have expected the increase in wealth to generally exceed saving, 
these inferences are not supported by the data in Figure 10. We must conclude that capital 
gains do not help to explain the discrepancy. 
Ando et al. (1994) and Alessie et al. (1999) have suggested a second possible source of 
conceptual discrepancy, namely inter vivos transfers. They speculated that the two measures 
of saving could be reconciled by the pattern of intergenerational net transfers. These transfers 
flow prevailingly from the old to the young, and are encouraged by the favorable taxation of 
gifts. If so, for the younger generations the increase in assets should tend to exceed saving (by 
net gifts received), while for the old it would tend to fall short (by the net gifts made).This is 
precisely the nature of the puzzling discrepancy in Figure 10. 
Neither Ando nor Alessie provide direct evidence to support their hunch on the issue. 
We have been able to carry out a rough test of the hypothesis on the basis of information 
available in our survey. Unfortunately, the information in consistent form is only available for 
the years 1998 and 2000. Using the response for inter vivos transfers, we have computed the 





Because we have only two year’s worth of information, we cannot apply the method 
used for other variables to disentangle the age effect from the cohort effect. To bypass this 
issue, we simply compute average net transfer by age, and then fit to these values a third 
degree polynomial in age, in this way smoothing the result. The smoothed curve is reported in 
Figure 13. Because Figure 13 is derived from cross-sectional means and is not adjusted for 
cohort effects, this profile is not directly comparable with the life cycle of saving presented in 
Figure 10. However, the path of net transfers is amazingly similar to the difference between 
the two inconsistent measures of saving reported in Figure 10. For the young (who are the net 
receivers in Figure 13) the increase in discretionary wealth exceeds saving, whereas for the 
old, (who are the net givers) the increase in wealth is lower than discretionary saving. Thus 
the change in wealth tends to overestimate the saving of the young and to underestimate the 
saving of the old. Still, we are not in position to say whether the explanation is sufficient, or 
whether it can account for the observed decline in wealth even though saving is positive. 
 
The effects of changing composition of the cohort 
 Despite its systematic and potentially important effect on the relationship between the 
two measures of accumulation, the membership of the cohort being sampled and the fact that 
it changes between surveys has gone all but unnoticed. One measure is the change in average 
wealth (W) between the surveys at age t and that at age t-1, say W(t) –W(t-1), and the other is 
the (average) saving rate in the interval between the two surveys, say S(t). 
In order to concentrate on the above issue it will be convenient to assume that, for every 
individual present, the change in assets between the survey at time t and the previous one at t-
1, is identical with his or her saving over the stated interval. We begin by classifying those 
living at t-1 into two sets, namely those that are alive and therefore respond at time t, the 
“survivors”, and those dying during the interval, the “deceased”. Since at time t only the 
survivors are responding, the average saving revealed by the survey will be precisely the 
average saving of the survivors, which we denote by Ss. Thus S(t) = Ss(t), which in turn equals 
the change in the average wealth of the survivors, Ws(t) -Ws(t-1). Thus: 
 






 gives S(t) in terms of the change in the average wealth of the survivors. We want to express it 
in terms of the change in the average wealth of the cohort, i.e. W(t)-W(t-1). Because the 
survivors are the only respondent at time t, we can conclude that Ws(t) is the same as W(t). 
The remaining task is to establish the relation between Ws(t-l) and W(t-1). That relation is 
easily secured by noting that W(t-1), being average wealth at time t-1, is simply a weighted 
average of the average wealth of the survivors Ws(t-l), and of the deceased, Wd(t-1), weighted 
by the share of survivors (Ns/N) and of the deceased Nd/N in the cohort at t-1, respectively. 
We can use this relation to substitute in (1) for Ws(t-l) in terms of W(t), and rearrange 
terms to get the following expression for the change in average assets: 
 
[ ] ) / ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( N N t W t W t S t W t W d d s − − − + = − −    (2) 
 
The interpretation of (2) should be obvious: if the survivors are richer than the 
deceased, then the average wealth will rise more than the average saving because it will be 
boosted by the elimination of a segment poorer than the average. As seen, there exists only 
one case in which the change in assets coincides with saving; this is when the deceased 
happened to be, on average, as rich as the survivor. 
Unfortunately (2) cannot be tested empirically since Ws(t-1) could only be ascertained 
with a panel, and even with a panel, Wd(t-1) could not be estimated because as a rule, a panel 
will only interview survivors. Therefore, it cannot provide information about the estate of the 
deceased. However as suggested earlier, it is well known that the probability of surviving is 
positively correlated with income and wealth, implying that on average the deceased are 
poorer than the survivors, i.e. Ws(t-1) > Wd(t-1). 
Currently, this conclusion is receiving further support. Through a novel and imaginative 
undertaking, Michael Hurd and his associates are endeavoring to secure information about the 
estate at the time of death of deceased members of a US Panel survey. From the information 
gathered from the Retirement History Survey, Hurd, McFadden and Merrill (2001) have 
constructed a table comparing the average wealth in the base year (1993) for the 75-79 age 
group of those who were still alive in 1995 – the survivors – with the wealth of those who 
subsequently died between 1993 and 1995. For males, the average 1993 wealth of the 





is 18 percent smaller. For females, the corresponding figures are 167 and 145, which is 13 
percent smaller. 
To the extent that these figures are representative, they suggest an appreciable 
discrepancy between S and the change in per capita wealth; indeed for the age group 75-79, 
the ratio of those dying in a year to the survivors can be placed at around 5 percent, and the 
difference  Wd(t-1)–Ws(t-1) at 0,85×Ws(t-1), implying a discrepancy of about 4 percent of 
wealth, which is large compared with the saving rate (e.g., in Italy, the average wealth 
holding is not far from 20 times saving). Clearly the size of the correction would vary with 
age. What is disappointing is that the above reasoning implies that at advanced ages the 
increase in wealth should exceed saving, whereas Figure 10 shows the very opposite. Of 
course our deceased effect could be overpowered by others, like the inter vivos transfer effect. 
With this background we can also deal quickly with the effect of new entrants in the 
cohort. Again, we classify those responding to the survey at time t into two sets, those who 
were present at time t-1 – the survivors – and those that entered after t-1, the entrants. The per 
capita saving S is the average, of the average saving of each group, weighted by their 
respective shares of the cohort population. Similarly, the average terminal wealth is the 
weighted average of the wealth of each group, while the average wealth at t-1, W(t-1), is only 
the wealth of the survivors, Ws(t-1). One can then readily verify that the change in average 
wealth is: 
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Thus, the growth of wealth will exceed average saving if the new entrants are wealthier 
than the survivors. Again, we have no direct (or indirect) information about the average initial 
wealth of the two groups; but in Figure 10 we observe that there is a large excess of asset 
growth over saving. We are lead to wonder whether it might reflect a not implausible, but 
relatively higher wealth of the entrants together with a high rate of entry. 
 
7. Hump wealth, LCH and the bequest motive 
 
The search for an explanation of the discrepancies between saving flows and changes in 






n? We suggest that there is no unique answer. The two measures focus on 
some
of the relative contribution to National 
Savin
d to future generations if it is not consumed 
befor
ing after retirement. This must imply that part of pension wealth is used to 
increa
, these causes do not seem to go very far in explaining the empirical discrepancies 
revealed by Figure 10. Indeed, some suggest a discrepancy opposite to that observed. The one 
possibly plausible explanation, which could be quantitatively large, is inter vivos transfers. It 
is substantiated by independent evidence on the timing and importance of intergenerational 
transfers. 
When the two measures are in conflict, which of them provides more useful 
informatio
what different things, thus which is best depends on what is to be measured. If one is 
interested in the life path of wealth, one should use the wealth measure and by the available 
evidence agree that wealth tends to decrease after retirement. If, on the other hand, one is 
interested in measuring the extent to which in old age, discretionary wealth continues to 
accumulate through saving - or is decumulated through consumption above income – than the 
appropriate measure of accumulation is saving. For the case of Italy we must conclude that 
discretionary saving remains positive, although small. 
This conclusion does not have any direct implications for our test of LCH, but it is 
relevant for an understanding of bequest behavior, and 
g of Life Cycle accumulation versus accumulation for intergenerational transfers. It 
should be remembered in this connection that, contrary to a common perception, some 
accumulation for bequests is not inconsistent with LCH. The distinctive feature of this model 
is not the absence of bequests, but rather that some portion of accumulated wealth is drawn 
down to support retired consumption, which essentially means that the age profile of wealth is 
hump shaped. In the case of Italy we have seen that this implication is amply verified both in 
terms of stocks (Figure 5) and flows (Figure 9). 
 The age-profile of discretionary wealth is relevant for bequest behavior because it is 
the only component of wealth that can be passe
e the termination of the household. In contrast, annuitized wealth, which includes all 
public pension rights, disappears when the retired dies: even though part of wealth is 
transferred through survivors’ benefits, the survivors cannot transfer the capital to future 
generations. 
Suppose one observes a hump in total wealth, but not in discretionary wealth, which 
keeps increas
se discretionary wealth. If retirees continue to accumulate bequeathable wealth, the 





ntergenerational transfers as a 
sourc
urvey, may be seriously upward biased. It must 
be re
sed members of a panel. These findings make it possible 
to com
Beyond this qualitative statement, the age profile of discretionary wealth cannot provide 
much guidance for estimating the quantitative importance of i
e of accumulation. There are several reasons for this conclusion. In the first place there 
is considerable uncertainty about the path of discretionary wealth in the retirement stretch; we 
recall that, where data concerning the behavior of wealth are available, they consistently show 
that it declines in the post retirement period. To be sure, saving estimates, which may 
conceptually provide a more reliable measure, do not support the decline but still leave room 
for some uncertainty, especially when one recalls that the survey responses tend to 
overestimate saving by well over 50 percent. 
There is yet a more serious problem to consider, namely the likelihood that, at advanced 
ages, the saving estimates generated by the s
membered that what we are interested in estimating is the average saving rate 
(disposable income – consumption) during a given age, say the 75
th  year, for all those 
members of the cohort that have survived until age 75. What we can draw from the survey (or 
a panel) is the average saving of those who survived until the next survey, since they are the 
only ones that can respond as regards their activity in the past period (the 75
th year). The 
overall average we are seeking is clearly the weighted average of the saving rate of the 
survivors and of the deceased weighted by the size of the two groups. Unfortunately we have 
no available estimate of the saving rate of the deceased, for the simple reason that they cannot 
be interviewed. However, we can make some educated guesses about the unknown saving 
rate by recalling earlier references to a well-established negative correlation between 
mortality and wealth. It implies that on the average the deceased are poorer than the survivors 
and should tend to save less. But in addition, the saving of the deceased might be adversely 
affected by the occurrence of death. 
This hypothesis receives some confirmation. Hurd and associates worked to secure 
information about the estate of decea
pare the wealth reported in the last survey preceding death with the estate ascertained 
as of the time of death; the difference, then, is an estimate of the saving during the interval. 
According to the figures reported in Hurd and Smith (2001), the average value of the estate at 
death (95 thousand dollars) was much smaller than that preceding death (130 thousand) by 
over ¼, implying a large rate of dissaving. Since the deceased constitute a rapidly rising share 
of those surviving, a substantial dissaving on their part, together with a small and dwindling 





ould be of much help in establishing 
the qu
the amount of 
beque
n dictated by the bequest motive. This is because 
part o
In other words it is conceivable that the richer, recorded survivor may continue to save , but 
the poorer unrecorded deceased may dissave enough to push the whole cohort into spending 
more than income. Because of questions raised by authors regarding treatment of the value of 
the house in the estate of the surviving spouse, and because we have no idea as to the 
magnitude of inter vivos transfers, which again should be subtracted from the dissaving, the 
above estimate should be recognized as very uncertain.  
Even if we could obtain a more reliable estimate of the rate of saving (positive or 
negative) in the retirement phase, it is unlikely that it w
antitative importance of bequests, or even less of the bequest motive. On the one hand, 
the amount of wealth held at various ages does not represent bequests, and tells us little about 
them. Clearly bequests will be whatever remains after the survivor spouse dies (infra-family 
transfers should not be counted as bequests). On the other hand, the amounts bequeathed or 
transferred include transfers by those that have already died or made transfers. 
Some evidence on the importance of bequests and gifts is available for Italy. A special 
section of the 1991 SHIW asks each member of the household to report 
sts and gifts received in the past from parents or other relatives, and the year of receipt. 
This information is used in Guiso and Jappelli (2002) to compute the aggregate share of 
transfers in total wealth. On average, in 1991 each household received about 30,000 euro, 
24.3 percent of discretionary wealth (20.2 percent bequests and 4.1 percent gifts). This figure 
is consistent with the results reported by Modigliani (1988) and Wolff (2002) for the United 
States, to the effect that the share of transfer wealth does not exceed one fourth. However, this 
information is available for recipients, and we have no information on how transfers affect the 
age saving and wealth profiles of donors. 
In closing, it must also be remembered that the amount of bequests left and received 
cannot be identified with the accumulatio
f bequests may constitute unintentional bequest resulting from the holding of wealth for 
precautionary reasons. Given life uncertainty, risk-averse consumers will always find it 










Our analysis, which is based on Italian repeated cross-sectional data, supports the Life-
Cycle





 Hypothesis of humped wealth, or saving turning negative after retirement, once 
mandated pension saving and pension wealth is duly taken into account. It can be argued that 
because people cannot choose the amount of mandatory saving, they should be ignored when 
it comes to understanding the household’s behavior. But since people can change 
discretionary saving in response to changes in mandatory saving, total saving is the relevant 
measure of the change in assets accumulated for retirement. After all, the existence of 
mandatory saving programs and the widespread implementation of retirement plans should be 
interpreted as the social approval of schemes designed to ensure people with adequate 
reserves to be spend during retirement. 
For these reasons, discretionar
cting mandatory saving and pension wealth, respectively from total saving and total 
wealth) are not relevant indicators of accumulation for retirement in societies in which a 
major source of provision for retirement is provided for by mandated pension programs. Thus 
the shape of one component of total saving, like discretionary saving, cannot be cited as 
evidence in favor of or against the LCH, as has been done in several writings cited earlier. 
As for the age profile of discretionary wealth, the data for Italy (and other countri
 room for considerable doubt as to whether it is humped shaped, once account is taken of 
the contribution of the growing number of deceased to the cohort saving. It must be 
recognized that the decline during retirement is at best slow, which is consistent with non-
negligible bequests (partly involuntary, resulting from precautionary motives). Data 
separately collected by our SHIW survey has resulted in an estimate of transfer wealth of 
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THE SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND WEALTH (SHIW) The data set includes the 1989, 1991, 
1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 SHIW. The survey is representative of the Italian population because 
probability selection is enforced at every stage of sampling. The unit of observation is the family, 
which is defined to include all persons residing in the same dwelling who are related by blood, 
marriage or adoption. Individuals selected as "partners or other common-law relationships" are also 
treated as families. The interviews are generally conducted between May and September of each year, 
thus flow variables refer to the previous calendar year, and stock variables are end-of period values. 
All statistics reported in this paper use sample weights. Nominal figures are deflated by the CPI and 
then converted in euro. 
 
CONSUMPTION  Sum of durable and non-durable consumption, including imputed rents on owner-
occupied housing.  
 
EARNED INCOME Sum of households earnings, transfers, capital income and income from financial 
assets, net of taxes. Earnings are the sum of wages and salaries, self-employment income, less income 
taxes. Wages and salaries include overtime bonuses, fringe benefits and payments in kind, and exclude 
withholding taxes. Self-employment income is net of taxes and includes income from unincorporated 
businesses, net of depreciation of physical assets. Capital income includes imputed rents on owner-
occupied housing. 
 
DISPOSABLE INCOME Earned income plus pension benefits less social security contributions. 
 
DISCRETIONARY WEALTH Net financial assets and real assets less household debt (mortgage loans, 
consumer credit and other personal loans) and business debt. Real assets are the sum of real estate, 
unincorporated business holdings and the stock of durable goods  
 
PENSION WEALTH Since in Italy very few workers hold private pension funds, pension wealth largely 
coincides with social security wealth. For current workers we compute pension wealth as the 
difference between the discounted value of benefits and the discounted value of contributions. Social 
security contributions are assumed to be a flat rate of 25 percent in all years. At each age, the stream of 
social security benefits depends on expected retirement, survival probabilities, the expected 
replacement rate, expected earnings at retirement, the rate of growth of pension benefits during 
retirement and the real rate of interest at which people discount future benefits. We do not distinguish 
between men and women and assume that the household retires at age 60, and that the replacement 
rate is 70 percent, about the level prevailing in the last decade. We use mortality tables for women to 
impute the survival probabilities. Expected earnings at retirement are estimated by the fitted value of a 
regression of log earnings on a fifth-order age polynomial, a set of cohort dummies and a set of 
restricted time dummies. Using the fitted values form this regression, we project for each age-year-
cohort group the earnings at the assumed retirement age of 60. We also assume that the growth rate of 
earnings equals the real interest rate and that pensions are fully indexed to the cost of living. For the 
currently retired we compute the present discounted value of pension benefits, based on current 








A comparison between measures of aggregate saving and wealth derived from 
national accounts and survey data 
 
The national accounts saving rate and wealth-income ratio are drawn from the Annual Report of the 
Bank of Italy and the OECD Economic Outlook. The microeconomic estimates of the aggregate 
saving rate and of the aggregate wealth-income ratio are computed using the SHIW. The 
microeconomic estimates use sample weights and the entire data set for each survey year. 
 
 
Year  Household saving rate  Wealth-income ratio 
 
Number of households 
 National 
accounts 
Survey data  Financial 
accounts 
 
Survey data  Total  Used in the 
estimation 
1989  16.7 26.4 4.41 4.34  8,297  7,938 
1991  18.2 24.0 4.55 4.94  8,188  7,884 
1993  15.8 25.0 5.09 5.93  8,089  7,908 
1995  13.6 23.4 5.00 6.03  8,135  7,993 
1998  14.7 28.6 5.15 5.92  7,147  7,061 







Discretionary wealth, by age and cohort 
 
The figure plots median discretionary wealth, by age and cohort. Each number in the graph 
represents a different cohort, going from 20 (household heads born in 1920) to 70 (heads born 

























































































20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80









Discretionary wealth of older cohorts 
 
The figure plots median discretionary wealth, by age and cohort. Each number in the graph represents 
a different cohort, going from 20 (household heads born in 1920) to 36 (heads born in 1936). Wealth 
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Age profile of discretionary wealth 
 
The age dummies are obtained from a regression of median discretionary wealth on age dummies, 
cohort dummies and restricted time dummies. The smoothed profile is obtained by regressing the age 
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Cohort effect of discretionary wealth 
 
The cohort dummies are obtained from a regression of discretionary wealth on age dummies, cohort 
dummies and restricted time dummies. The smoothed profile is obtained regressing the cohort 
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Age profile of discretionary, pension and total wealth 
 
The lines in the figure represent the age dummies estimated from regressions of median discretionary 
wealth, pension wealth and total wealth on age dummies, cohort dummies and restricted time 
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Age profile of change in wealth 
 
The lines in the figure represent the increment from one age to the next of discretionary wealth, 
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Age profile of consumption and income 
 
 
The age dummies are estimated from regressions of median income and consumption on age dummies, 
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The life cycle of family size 
 
The age dummies are obtained from a regression of family size on age dummies, cohort dummies and 
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The age profile of discretionary, mandatory and total saving 
 
The lines in the figure represent the age profiles of discretionary saving, mandatory saving and total 
saving. Discretionary saving is the difference between conventional disposable income and 
consumption; total saving is the difference between earned income and consumption; mandatory 
saving is the difference between total and discretionary saving. Each profile is estimated from 
regressions of saving on age dummies, cohort dummies and restricted time dummies. The age 
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Age profile of discretionary saving and of increment in discretionary wealth 
 
The lines in the figure represent the age profiles of the increment in discretionary wealth (from Figure 
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Discretionary saving, by age and cohort 
 
The figure plots median discretionary saving, by age and cohort. Each number in the graph represents 
a different cohort, going from 20 (household heads born in 1920) to 70 (heads born in 1970). Saving is 
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The age profile of discretionary saving 
 
The age dummies are obtained from a regression of median discretionary saving on age dummies, 
cohort dummies and restricted time dummies. The smoothed profile is obtained by regressing the age 
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 Figure 13 
Age profile of net inter vivos transfers received by the household 
 
Average net transfers received by the household are the difference between transfers received and 
transfers given. The profile is obtained by regressing net transfers received on third order age 
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